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2:00 pm
February 3, 2011
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Ray Kurzweil has expressed a desire to "re-create" his father using various AI technologies when they become available.
From Wikipedia: "While being interviewed for a February 2009 issue of Rolling Stone magazine, Kurzweil expressed a desire to construct a genetic copy of his late father, Fredric Kurzweil, from DNA within his grave site. This feat would be achieved by deploying various nanorobots to send samples of DNA back from the grave, constructing a clone of Fredric and retrieving memories and recollections—from Ray's mind—of his father." (The referenced RS article is not available online to the general public.)
Suppose eventually scientists are able to "resurrect" a person who has died, and who did NOT have cryogenics preservation (either opted out, or the circumstances of death did not allow for preservation). Suppose the person who died under these circumstances was you. Also suppose the culmination of the Singularity or otherwise sufficiently advanced technology allowed for "re-creating" dead and unpreserved people via the Kurzweil method, and you were re-created as either:
1. highly complex AI software
2. AI in a 100% synthetic body
3. AI in a "donated" human body
Assuming the re-creation technology allowed for the "re-created mind" to have the mental intelligence, memories, opinions, predilections, abilities, etc of your previous "living mind," would this re-created mind be "you," as your mind is "you" in your day-to-day living state?
Or would the previous you be gone, even though the re-created you would 100% self-identify as the previous you?
My own thought on this is I don't believe an identical mind can be re-created from DNA plus memories and recollections of another person. Aside from that, I don't know. Anyone else have an opinion?
3:12 pm
March 2, 2011
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Good timing for this question because I just re-watched Transcendent Man last weekend. This time I had my parents watch it with me and offer their opinions. My mother felt that Kurzweil had not properly grieved the loss of his father, and although his sentiments and plans were very touching, felt that the grief may have been clouding his judgement.
I agree with you CMStewert, I don't think the same 'I' could result from this method of resurrection. In addition, there is no way to avoid eerie situations in this context because the person would claim to be the real person, the person themselves (if they could even function with this patchwork of memories) would not know any different. Only others would be able to tell that it was not the same person… and wouldn't that be kind of difficult to be around, especially if you have an emotional attachment to them so deep that you went to all that effort to bring them back?
The only way I can see Kurzweil's formulation of things working is if he has a really relaxed definition of personhood.
Good question… would be nice to hear others' responses.
Nikki Olson
3:50 pm
April 3, 2011
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I think one of the givens bringing someone back no matter how you do it is that they might look the same and have some shared experiences but internally they would not be the same. So you would enjoy teaching them about themselves, debating sameness and differences. If one was not looking forward to that opportunity, that experience, then bringing them back would not be worthwhile.
It would be a little like identical twins when you start talking to one thinking it is the other!
Best regards. – Kim
5:04 pm
February 3, 2011
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Yes, that would indeed be eerie! And it makes me question the nature of interpersonal attachments. If you "re-created" your deceased parent, child, friend or spouse, etc, and did it extremely well, the re-created person would have memories of their relationship with you, but wouldn't have actually experienced the events which would have otherwise created those memories. You yourself would have both the memories and the memory-creating experiences (from your perspective). I imagine trying to interact with someone I've known a long time, in this re-creation situation. The recreated person could look and behave just like the person on whom they were based. Still I would feel creeped out, (at least at first) but I don't know exactly why.
@Kim Yes, I agree with the identical twin analogy. Even if the "identical twins" have the same memories (one via experiences and the other via memory implantation) they're not exactly the same. But what if the Singularity spawned technology which could COMPLETELY scan a living person before or at the moment of death, and then make a copy of that person? Would the identical twin analogy still apply? If you were scanned and replicated, would the entirety of "you" reside in your original self AND in your copy? If the entirety of your thought processes are uploaded into a computer, did you actually preserve your original consciousness? I guess I'm trying to define the concept of a continuous selfhood, and at the same time trying to decide if continuous selfhood is an illusory construct.
6:23 pm
March 2, 2011
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"If you were scanned and replicated, would the entirety of "you" reside in your original self AND in your copy?"
-Assuming scanning and uploading works as we'd like, and nothing is lost in the copy, yes! What an odd circumstance this will be when/if it occurs!
"If the entirety of your thought processes are uploaded into a computer, did you actually preserve your original consciousness?"
-What helps me to think about this is to add the dimension of 'time' into the thought experiment.
I think about the relationship between the 'me' of right now, and the 'me of 5 seconds ago', and ask, 'what kind of continuity is there between these two things'?
-there is 'biological continuity' in that the 'me of 5 seconds ago' and the 'me of right now' are made of mostly the same matter.
-but there is also 'organizational continuity' in that the matter that makes me up is for the most part organized in the same way it was 5 seconds ago.
Now turn this example into a circumstance of uploading. Now the 'me of 5 seconds ago' is biological, and the 'me of right now' is virtual. (assuming the old body is in a suspended state, or as many transhumanists say, 'halted')
We ask, what in this circumstance is the relation between the 'me of 5 seconds ago' and the '(virtual) me of right now'….
Obviously we have broken the 'biological continuity' in this circumstance. But the only way in which breaking the biological continuity matters is if it is not properly represented in the simulation.
But other than that, the '(virtual) me of right now' stands in the same relation to the 'me of 5 seconds ago' as it did when both existed in real reality.
So, assuming the copy is 'perfect', 'identity' is maintained just as your identity is maintained between the ' (biological) you of right now' and the 'you of 5 seconds ago'. If 'uploading' works, the experience will be like the experience of continuity we get in real reality. It would literally feel like 'waking up' in the virtual world.
I find this quote helpful: "I am not a noun, I am an adjective. I am the way that matter behaves when it is organized in a Nikki Olsonish kind of way" (John K Clark quote?)
7:24 pm
February 3, 2011
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Yes, adding time illustrates continuity, but I'm not sure it does anything for original selfhood. Image you are scanned and replicated, and both the original you and the replicated you exist at the same time. The original you would still experience life from within your original body, NOT from within your original body PLUS the body of the copy. Obviously (I presume) your original consciousness wouldn't be residing in the copy, otherwise you would experience your environment through your original body and your copy body at the same time. So a consciousness separate from your own resides within the brain of the copy.
Here's an illustrative scenario: Imagine you and your exact, perfect copy as roommates. One day circumstances within your environment influence you to kill your copy, or vice-versa. Would you have killed your literal yourself (yet still be alive)? Or would it be a case of you killing your copy (or your copy killing you)?
Great adjective quote!
8:49 pm
March 2, 2011
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@CMStewert
"The original you would still experience life from within your original body, NOT from within your original body PLUS the body of the copy"
-Yes, exactly. There would be two entities in the world with the exact same internal experience. (it stops being identical as the experiences between original and copy diverge–our consciousness changes with experience–another reason why time I feel it is so important in these illustrations)
"So a consciousness separate from your own resides within the brain of the copy."
-Yes, and the consciousness is identical. (again, it stops being identical as the experiences between original and copy diverge)
One day circumstances within your environment influence you to kill your copy, or vice-versa. Would you have killed your literal yourself (yet still be alive)? Or would it be a case of you killing your copy (or your copy killing you)?
I have seen the response to this sort of question go in two main directions:
1. Some argue that it depends upon whether or not what you 'kill' is 'running', because you have to be 'running' in order to be conscious.
That is why some Transhumanists propose that the upload be done by putting the original body under anesthesia and then never waking it up. They think in the circumstance of the body being 'halted', that as long as that entity continues somewhere else, then it is not murder.
However, they argue, if the original is running when you copy it, and then you shut it down, it would be murder.
So in the situation you discuss where both are 'running', then killing either would be murder. You have killed your 'original self' if you kill the body, but it is no longer yourself in the sense that you are not the same thing you were 5 seconds ago, merely a continuation of that thing.
Others I have found like to make this argument:
2. Any discontinuation of an entity is murder, regardless of whether or not that entity is running, and/or continues somewhere else.
I don't know where I stand on this. At the quantum mechanical level, there is no murder as long as there is continuation. But because we interact with the world at a higher level of abstraction, it seems as though any discontinuation is murder.
I found this 3 min clip of Eliezer and Massimo to be useful on this topic. They each take one of the sides I outlined above: http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlo…..;out=50:27 As well as this 4 min clip from the same conversation: http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlo…..=54:00
12:01 am
July 18, 2011
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Interesting debate about the problematics of the continuity of "me". Unfortunately, it is very difficult to follow and argue on the ramifications of this line of argument.
Here is a scenario where I can, I think, relate to the debate.
Say it is 2035, and we can clone our enhanced bodies. I will of course have at least one body in store for a backup, a backup that I keep automatically up to date to the millisecond.
When I die – wait – I don’t even have to kill that current perfectly good, permanent body.
OK, when I decide to walk to the lab and split my consciousness into 2 selves for the fun of it, I’ll wake up as a double of me.
But it may take 5 minutes to complete the duplication. No big deal. I’ll wait 5 minutes.
During those 5 minutes, I may read the latest news and change my mind about what I plan to do tonight, who I should hang out with, and what we’ll have for dinner.
Obviously, conflict will ensue with myself when me2 comes out and those choices for tonight are debated. And I will start to argue with myself (= me and me2) about the choices I (=me) made, and about the choices that are left to me. Pretty soon, the argument will sound like… twin brothers arguing with each other.
No "me" has been killed in the process. Two close personalities continue their separate paths from now on, and could live happily ever after.
Now, if I decide to stop this experiment and put back to sleep me2, and me2 doesn’t want to be "killed" – then maybe I can’t kill me2/him that easy. Why? Because that might be the law when we get there, and maybe because I’m happy to live with the 2 personalities I had in me anyway, and curious about where they’ll end up, and maybe because that world is big enough for both of me/us.
Actually, I could avoid all that trouble by splitting into the multiple personalities that I have at various moments in life, and launch them out there in "virtual" reality situations that take the whole of "me" "live" to various planets, on top of robots, or tagged to other intelligent entities I follow. I could synchronize myself with all my personalities to the millisecond, and enrich my life with all of those "out-of-body" experiences.
Anyways, sure is fun to talk about the future ;)
10:53 pm
February 3, 2011
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After a few months of back-burner pondering, I return to this question. I'm obsessive like that. 
@Nikki Thank you for the clips. 
"1. Some argue that it depends upon whether or not what you 'kill' is 'running', because you have to be 'running' in order to be conscious. That is why some Transhumanists propose that the upload be done by putting the original body under anesthesia and then never waking it up."
I imagine a transcendent technology which will allow people to make unlimited copies of themselves. I also imagine a copying trend in which more copies of yourself equals more status and security. If you can make one copy, you can make two copies, and so on. With unlimited space and resources, would there be a practical limit to the number of copies one could make? People could have vast banks of "non-running" copies of themselves, then decide to "run" all of them at once in a display of megalomania. Once those copies start running, the original entity could not discontinue them, as they would all be separate entities with separate personalities.
"2. Any discontinuation of an entity is murder, regardless of whether or not that entity is running, and/or continues somewhere else."
Yes, that seems logical, as each conscious / unconscious entity *could have* argued for self-continuation, if given the choice. And now I imagine the scenario I described above applied to the "discontinuation is murder" argument. Billions of copies of a single original entity all equally protected under law. People won't have children, they'll simply make copies of themselves. Some Singularians claim that all will be utopian after the Singularity, and so maybe laws will become irrelevant. As I understand it, the question of discontinuation would be irrelevant because in a true utopia, non-utopian actions and reactions won't exist.
@Androide "Actually, I could avoid all that trouble by splitting into the multiple personalities that I have at various moments in life, and launch them out there in 'virtual' reality situations . . . synchronize myself with all my personalities to the millisecond, and enrich my life with all of those 'out-of-body' experiences."
In a non-utopian existence, virtual reality seems to be the "quick fix" to potentially warring copies. But then again, I'm speaking as a non-virtual entity (or so I think).
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